Red Hat's upcoming Automation Orchestrator (coming Q3 2026) wraps AI-driven investigation and human governance around Ansible Automation Platform (AAP), so that "AI isn't improvising against production infrastructure, it's acting through AAP." The pipeline runs five stages — alerts, event-driven trigger, AI analysis, human approval, and automated remediation — and this example focuses on that last stage: Step 5, where the approved plan actually touches hosts.

Step 5 config: rolling remediation job template

# orchestrator-step5-remediation.yml
# Automated remediation stage: executes the human-approved plan
# via an existing AAP job template, in rolling batches.
name: cve-2024-6387-openssh-remediation
step: 5
type: job_template_launch
job_template: "Patch OpenSSH - regresshion (CVE-2024-6387)"
inventory: production-linux-hosts
limit: "host_group_openssh_affected"
credentials:
  - "Production SSH Key"
job_slicing:
  strategy: rolling
  batch_size: 4
  batches: 3
  max_fail_percentage: 0            # abort the workflow on any batch failure
extra_vars:
  target_service: sshd
  package_name: openssh-server
  perform_health_check: true
  rollback_on_health_check_failure: true
notifications:
  on_success:
    - itsm_update: "INC0038291"
      status: "Resolved"
  on_failure:
    - itsm_update: "INC0038291"
      status: "Remediation failed - manual review required"
audit:
  log_execution: true
  attach_to_ticket: "INC0038291"

What it does

This step definition tells the orchestrator to launch an existing AAP job template — not an ad-hoc script — against the host group the AI agent correlated from inventory during Step 3. job_slicing splits the affected fleet into rolling batches instead of a single big-bang push: with 12 hosts across prod, staging, and dev, that's 3 batches of 4. Each batch patches openssh-server, restarts sshd, and runs a health check before the orchestrator proceeds to the next batch. max_fail_percentage: 0 means any failed batch halts the rollout immediately rather than continuing to hammer the rest of the fleet — the deterministic, auditable behavior the platform is built around.

The notifications and audit blocks close the loop back into ITSM: the same ServiceNow ticket that triggered the workflow (INC0038291) gets updated and closed automatically, with the execution log attached for compliance review.

Step 5 only runs after the governance gate in Step 4 clears. That gate has its own configurable shape:

human_review_gate:
  step: 4
  notify_users:
    - "sre-oncall"
    - "security-lead"
  message: "Please approve this deployment to production"
  timeout: 1d
  on_timeout: fail_workflow   # never auto-approve on timeout

In the Red Hat Tech Day Netherlands 2026 demo of this exact CVE-2024-6387 ("regresshion") remediation, that manual review took 38.4 seconds — everything else in the 8-step run (alert ingestion, ITSM ticket creation, vulnerability analysis, remediation execution, ticket close) added up to under 10 seconds of automated time.

Notes

  • job_slicing.batch_size and batches should match your host group's actual size — miscounting here either leaves hosts unpatched or creates an empty final batch.
  • max_fail_percentage: 0 is the safe default for security remediations; raise it only for lower-risk, higher-host-count rollouts where a few stragglers are acceptable.
  • on_timeout: fail_workflow on the review gate is deliberate: the platform never silently auto-approves a production change just because nobody responded in time.
  • Step 5 is only as trustworthy as the job template it launches — the AI agent in Step 3 matches an existing remediation job template rather than generating new automation on the fly.

Takeaway

Step 5 is where governance meets execution: the orchestrator hands a human-approved plan to a rolling AAP job template, batches it across the fleet with a hard failure threshold, and closes the loop in the ticketing system — all without a human ever touching a host directly.

References